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Abstract—While many cloud storage systems allow users to
protect their data by making use of encryption, only few support
collaborative editing on that data. A major challenge for enabling
such collaboration is the need to enforce cryptographic access
control policies in a secure and efficient manner. In this paper,
we introduce IBBE-SGX, a new cryptographic access control
extension that is efficient both in terms of computation and
storage even when processing large and dynamic workloads of
membership operations, while at the same time offering zero
knowledge guarantees.
IBBE-SGX builds upon Identity-Based Broadcasting Encryp-
tion (IBBE). We address IBBE’s impracticality for cloud de-
ployments by exploiting Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX)
to derive cuts in the computational complexity. Moreover, we
propose a group partitioning mechanism such that the compu-
tational cost of membership update is bound to a fixed constant
partition size rather than the size of the whole group. We have
implemented and evaluated our new access control extension.
Results highlight that IBBE-SGX performs membership changes
1.2 orders of magnitude faster than the traditional approach of
Hybrid Encryption (HE), producing group metadata that are 6
orders of magnitude smaller than HE, while at the same time
offering zero knowledge guarantees.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud storage services such as Amazon Web Services,
Google Cloud Platform or Microsoft Azure have shown rapid
adoption during the last years [1]. However, they lack in
offering trustworthiness and confidentiality guarantees to end
users. Although threats commonly originate from malicious
adversaries breaching security measures to gain access to
user data, the menace can also come from an employee with
generous privileges, or curious governments warranting data
collection for national interest. To overcome these issues,
many approaches rely on the construction of cryptographic
solutions in which the data is secured on the client side before
reaching the storage premises [2], therefore mitigating the lack
of trust in the cloud provider.
To enable collaborative operations on the already secured
data, one needs to enforce access control policies. Because
of the untrusted nature of cloud storage, such administrative
operations also need to be cryptographically protected. En-
forcing cryptographic access control on an untrusted cloud
storage context is subject to a number of requirements. First,
access control schemes should incur as low traffic overhead
as possible because cloud storages have slower response times
in comparison to traditional storage mediums. Second, since
a realistic and dynamic membership operations pattern [3]
coupled with large volumes of users can make the system un-
usable in practice, the system must be limited to an acceptable
computational bound. Third, as only privileged users perform
access control operations, it is required that they gain zero
knowledge to the data content to which the policy is applied.
Last, identities normally employed by users when interacting
with the cloud storage (i.e. existing credentials) should be
sufficient for membership operations, hence avoiding complex
trust establishment protocols.
A number of cryptographic constructions have been pro-
posed for achieving access control. The simplest one, pop-
ularly referred to as Hybrid Encryption (HE), makes use of
symmetric and public-key cryptography, by employing the
former on the actual data and the latter on the symmetric
key [4]. Other approaches rely on pairing-based cryptography
as a substitute for public-key cryptography, and offer different
levels of granularity for specifying access control policies. A
few examples include: Identity Based Encryption (IBE) [5]
which works similarly to public-key encryption at the identity
level; Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) [6] that supports a
richer tree-like access policy expressiveness; or Identity-Based
Broadcasting Encryption (IBBE) [7] that can capture group-
like policies. Similarly, Identity-based proxy re-encryption
relies on a semi-trusted middle entity to whom users delegate
the re-encryption rights [8].
Unfortunately, pairing-based constructions suffer from im-
portant performance issues. According to Garrison et al. [3],
they are an order of magnitude slower than public-key cryptog-
raphy. Remarkably, even Hybrid Encryption with Public Key
(HE-PKI) incurs prohibitive costs for dynamic access control
(see Figure 2). Moreover, the aforementioned constructions do
not guarantee our zero knowledge requirement.
In this paper, we introduce a new cryptographic access con-
trol scheme that is both computationally- and storage-efficient
considering a dynamic and large set of membership operations,
while offering zero knowledge guarantees. Zero knowledge
is guaranteed by executing the cryptographic access control
membership operations in a Trusted Execution Environment
(TEE).1 Our scheme is based on IBBE which is known to
be flexible enough to produce small constant policy sizes.
Its main drawback is its high impracticable computational
cost. Our solution is to execute the membership operations
1Only membership operations rely on the TEE; user operations are done
in a conventional execution environment.
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of IBBE within the TEE so that we can make use of a master
secret key. The TEE guarantees that this secret stays within
the trusted computing boundary. We can therefore propose an
optimization of a well-studied IBBE scheme [9] that drasti-
cally reduces its computational complexity. A remaining issue
is the computational complexity required for users to derive
membership changes. To mitigate this last aspect, we propose
a group partitioning mechanism such that the computational
cost on the user-side is bound to a fixed constant partition size
rather than the potential large group size.
We have implemented our new access control scheme using
Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) as TEE. To the best
of our knowledge, we are the first to adapt the pairing-
based-specific library PBC [10] and its underlying dependency
GMP [11] to accurately run within SGX. Moreover, we
deployed our system on a commercially-available public cloud
storage. Our evaluation shows that our scheme only requires
few resources while performing better than HE, in addition to
providing zero knowledge.
To summarize, our contributions are the following:
• We propose a new approach to IBBE by confiding in Intel
SGX. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first effort
seeking to lower the computational complexity bound
of a well-studied IBBE scheme using TEEs as enabling
technology. Additionally, our scheme only requires TEE
support for a minimal set of users (i.e. administrators).
• We instantiate the novel IBBE-SGX construction to an
access control system hosted on a honest-but-curious
cloud storage, proposing an original partitioning scheme
that lowers the time required by users to ingest access
control changes.
• We fully implemented our original access control sys-
tem and evaluated it against a realistic setup. We con-
ducted extensive evaluations, showing that our system
surpasses the performances obtained using state-of-the-
art approaches.
Even though the main motivation for this work is to securely
share data in a cloud environment, the proposed solution
can be applied for encrypting arbitrary information that is
securely broadcasted to a group of users over any shared
media. Some other examples, besides cloud storages, are peer-
to-peer networks or pay-per-view TV.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the model assumptions undertaken within the problem
context. We provide some background about Intel SGX and
cryptographic schemes in Section III. Section IV presents the
unique constructions that allow us to lower the complexity of
an access control scheme by relying on a TEE. In the second
part of that section, details about the partitioning mechanism
are shown. We describe the design and implementation of an
end-to-end system built on top of the scheme in section V.
Section VI presents the evaluation of our solution by perform-
ing both micro- and macro-benchmarks. Section VII presents
the related work in the fields of cryptography, access control
systems and SGX. Finally, Section VIII concludes and presents
future work.
Groups Access Control
G1 Key
Group 1 
Data
Cloud Storage
Administrator
G2 Key
...
Group 2 
Data
Fig. 1. Model diagram.
II. MODEL
In this study, we consider groups of users who perform col-
laborative editing on cryptographically-protected data stored
on untrusted cloud storage systems. The data is protected
using a block cipher encryption algorithm such as Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) making use of a symmetric group
key gk. As illustrated in Figure 1, this work addresses the
challenge of designing a system for group access control, in
which the group key gk is cryptographically protected and
derivable only by the members of the group. Because groups
may become large with a significant turnover in their members,
we investigate the implication of numerous member additions
and revocations happening throughout their lifetimes.
We distinguish between two types of actors interacting
within the system: administrators and users. All group mem-
bership operations are performed by administrators. Their
duties include creating groups, and adding or revoking group
members. The administrators manifest an honest-but-curious
behavior, correctly serving work requests but with a possible
malicious intent of discovering the group key gk. On the other
hand, users listen to the cloud storage for group membership
changes, and derive the new group key gk whenever it
changes. Users are considered of having a trusted behavior.
The role of the cloud storage is to store the definitions of
groups access control, also referred to as groups metadata,
together with the list of members composing the group, and
the actual group data. Besides being a storage medium, we also
use the cloud storage as a broadcasting interface for group ac-
cess control changes. Administrators are communicating with
the cloud each time a group membership operation takes place
so that users can be notified of the group membership update.
We consider the cloud storage to show a similar behavior than
administrators (i.e. honest-but-curious). It correctly services
assigned tasks albeit with a possible malicious intent of
peeking into the groups secrets. Moreover, when manifesting
the curious behavior, the cloud storage could collude with any
number of curious administrators or revoked users.
Size-wise, we target a solution that can accommodate
groups of a very large-scale nature.2 It is desired that adminis-
trators perform membership changes for multiple groups at a
time, therefore the number of administrators is relatively small
when compared to the number of users.
We choose to ensure authenticity guarantees only with
respect to administrator identities, and therefore authenti-
cate membership changes operations. Also, authenticating the
2Our evaluation uses 1 million users as the largest group size.
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group data created by users is out of scope, the current
model being focused on confidentiality guarantees. Therefore,
the notion of a reference monitor [3], [12] on the cloud
storage is not pertinent within our context. Finally, we do
not consider hiding the identities of group members, nor
the type of executed membership operations, as they can be
inferred by the cloud storage from traffic access patterns.
Privacy constructions offering such guarantees [13]–[15] are
orthogonal to our work.
III. BACKGROUND
The building blocks that lead to the creation of our access
control extension are Intel SGX, Hybrid Encryption, and
Identity Based Broadcast Encryption. This background section
presents them together with open challenges.
A. Intel SGX
Intel SGX is an instruction extension available on modern
x86 CPUs manufactured by Intel. Similarly to ARM Trust-
zone [16] or Sanctum [17], SGX aims to shield code execution
against attacks from privileged code (e.g. infected operating
system) and certain physical attacks. A unit of code protected
by SGX is called an enclave. Computations done inside the
enclave cannot be seen from the outside [18]. SGX seamlessly
encrypts memory so that plaintext data is only present inside
the CPU package. The assumption is that opening the CPU
package is difficult for an attacker, and leaves clear evidence
of the breach. Encrypted memory is provided in a processor-
reserved memory area called the Enclave Page Cache (EPC),
which is limited to 128 MB in the current version of SGX.
Intel provides a way for enclaves to attest each other [19].
After the attestation process, enclaves will be sure that each
other is running the code that they are meant to execute. The
attestation process can be extended to remote attestation that
allows a piece of software running on a different machine
to make sure that a given enclave is running on a genuine
Intel SGX-capable CPU. An Intel-provided online service —
the Intel Attestation Service (IAS) — is used to check the
signature affixed to a quote created by the CPU [19]. As part
of the attestation process, it is possible to provision the enclave
with secrets. They will be securely transmitted to the enclave
if and only if the remote attestation process succeeds.
The Trusted Computing Base (TCB) of an SGX enclave is
composed of the CPU itself, and the code running within. The
assumption is that we trust Intel for securely implementing
SGX. Nevertheless, it has been shown that SGX is vulnerable
to side-channel attacks [20]. We consider this flaw to be
orthogonal to our research, and hence do not consider it in
our security evaluation.
B. A Naive Approach to Group Access Control
Suppose that we want to come up with a simple, yet secure,
cryptographic scheme to protect a group key gk. We can make
use of an asymmetrical encryption primitive [21], based on
RSA or Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). As each user in
the system possesses a public-private key pair, the scheme
consists in encrypting gk using the public key of each member
in the group. A member of the group can then deduce gk by
decrypting the resulting ciphertext using her private key. This
construction is sometimes referred to as Hybrid Encryption
(HE) [3], or Trivial Broadcast Encryption Scheme [22].
To achieve the zero knowledge requirement, administrators
could be asked to run HE within an SGX enclave, thus
protecting the discovery of gk. However, before discussing
the cost of such an integration between HE and SGX, we
point out a number of prior weaknesses of HE.
First, the amount of group metadata grows linearly with
the number of members in the group, making it impractical
in the context of very large groups. Second, when revoking
group members, a new key gk needs to be created; the
entire group metadata also needs to be generated again by
encrypting the latest value of gk. As the group size increases,
the computational cost of the scheme grows linearly. Likewise,
the latency incurred for putting, getting and storing the group
metadata on the cloud storage will also seriously expand.
Furthermore, when performing group membership opera-
tions, the administrators need to entrust the authenticity of
the public keys linked to the identity of the members. Public
Key Infrastructures (PKIs) [21] can be used to solve this
issue. Besides the trust risks that the PKI brings [23], one
needs to account for the practical costs of setting up, running
and accessing a PKI. To mitigate these risks, one could
choose to substitute public-key primitives with identity-based
ones. Identity Based Encryption (IBE) [5], [24] makes use
of arbitrary strings as public keys; we can therefore use a
user name directly as a public key. The user secret key is
generated at setup phase or later by a Trusted Authority (TA).
Obviously, both HE-PKI and Hybrid Encryption with Identity-
based Encryption (HE-IBE) have the same inner functioning,
when making abstraction of the key methodology choice.
Integrating SGX with HE-PKI and HE-IBE is required
in order to guarantee the zero knowledge property against
administrators. As hybrid encryption is causing a high group
metadata expansion, it has a direct impact on the memory
space that is used inside the SGX enclave. Accessing memory
in SGX enclaves can induce an overhead of up to 19.5 %
for write accesses and up to 102 % for read accesses [25].
Apprehensive about the hypothesized SGX degradation in
performance caused by the group metadata expansion, we shift
the focus on finding a solution with minimal expansion.
C. Broadcast Encryption (BE) and Identity-Based BE
In order to optimize both SGX and cloud transit costs,
we investigate the possibility of cryptographic schemes that
induce a minimal group expansion.
Broadcast Encryption (BE) [26] is a public-key cryptosys-
tem with a unique public key that envelopes the entire system,
contrary to the HE scheme where each user uses a different
public key. However, each user in a BE system has a unique
private key generated by a trusted authority. To randomly
generate a group key gk and the associated group metadata
(named encrypt operation within BE systems), one makes use
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of the system-wide public key. On the other side, when a user
wants to reveal gk (decrypt in BE systems), she makes use of
her individual private key.
As broadcast encryption schemes come with different con-
textual models, we impose a number of conditions. First, to
maintain the same threat model as HE, we are only investi-
gating the use of fully collusion-resistant BE schemes [27],
in which no coalition of members outside of the group could
reveal gk. Second, the set of users participating in the system
is not initially known, thus we rely on the usage of dynamic
BE schemes [28]. Third, as in the case of HE, we would prefer
constructions that can accommodate the use of IBE.
Piercing through the existing research literature, we iden-
tified an IBBE scheme [29] that not only fulfills all the
aforementioned requirements, but also operates with group
metadata expansions and user private keys of constant sizes.
Moreover, the scheme has an additional strategic advantage
that proves beneficial in our context: the system-wide public
key size is linear in the maximal size of any group.
Upon analyzing the computational complexity of the se-
lected IBBE scheme, one can notice that creating gk given a
set of members, as well as decrypting it as a user, are opera-
tions with a quadratic complexity in the number of members.
Therefore, even though the scheme brings a tremendous gain
in the size of group metadata expansion, the computational
cost of IBBE might be excessive for practical use.
Figure 2 exemplifies the performance of HE-PKI, HE-IBE
and IBBE schemes in their raw form, before any integration
with SGX is considered. The sub-figure on the left displays the
total time taken for the operation of creating a group while the
one on the right shows the size occupied by the expansion of
group metadata. The optimality of IBBE regarding the size of
group metadata expansion is immediately obvious. It always
produces 256 bytes of metadata, regardless of the number of
users per group. That is preferable compared to HE-PKI and
HE-IBE, which produce increasingly larger values, as much as
27 MB for groups of 100,000 users, and 274 MB for the largest
benchmarked group size. On the other hand, IBBE performs
much worse than HE-PKI when considering the execution
time. It is 150× and 144× slower for groups of 10,000 and
100,000 users, respectively.
There is no doubt that running the IBBE scheme in this
form is inadequate. In the remainder of this paper, we describe
two original contributions, one that changes a traditional
assumption of the IBBE scheme, and a second that lowers
the user decryption time.
IV. IBBE-SGX
IBBE-SGX can be broadly described in 3 steps: (i) trust
establishment and private key provisioning; (ii) membership
definitions and group key provisioning; and (iii) membership
changes and key updates.
A. Trust Establishment
IBBE schemes generate a single public key that can be
paired with several private keys, one per user. Users, in turn,
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(a) Latency for group creation.
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Fig. 2. Performance of HE-PKI, HE-IBE and IBBE, without zero knowledge.
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Fig. 3. Initial setup.
need to be sure that the private key they receive is indeed
generated by someone they trust, otherwise they would be
vulnerable to malicious entities trying to impersonate the
key issuer. To achieve that, we rely upon a PKI to provide
verifiable private keys to users.
Another security requirement of IBBE-SGX is that the key
management must be kept in a TEE. Therefore, there must
be a way of checking whether that is the case. On that front,
Intel SGX makes it possible to attest enclaves. Running this
procedure gives the assurance that a given piece of binary code
is truly the one running within an enclave, on a genuine Intel
SGX-capable processor (Section III-A).
Figure 3 illustrates the initial setup of trust that must be
executed at least once before any key leaves the enclave.
Initially, the enclaved code generates a pair of asymmetric
keys. While the private one never leaves the trusted domain,
the public key is sent along with the enclave measurement
to the Auditor (1), who is both responsible for attesting
the enclave and signing its certificate, thus also acting as a
Certificate Authority (CA). Next, the Auditor checks with IAS
(2) if the enclave is genuine. Being the case, it compares the
enclave measurement with the expected one, so that it can
be sure that the code inside the shielded execution context is
trustworthy. Once that is achieved, the CA issues the enclave’s
certificate (3), which also contains its public key. Finally,
users are able to receive their private keys and the enclave’s
certificate (4). The key will be encrypted by the enclave’s
private key generated in the beginning. To be sure they are
not communicating with rogue key issuers, users check the
signature in the certificate and then use the enclave’s public
key contained within. All communication channels described
in this scheme must be encrypted by cryptographic protocols
such as Transport Layer Security (TLS).
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B. From IBBE to IBBE-SGX
Traditionally, the IBBE scheme [7], [29] consists of the
following four operations.
1) System Setup: The system setup operation is run once
by a Trusted Authority (TA) and generates a Master Secret
Key MSK and a system-wide Public Key PK.
2) Extract User Secret: The TA then uses the Master Secret
Key MSK to extract the secret key USK for each user U .
3) Encrypt Broadcast Key: The broadcaster generates a
randomized Broadcast Key bk for a given set of receivers S,
by making use of PK. Together with bk, the operation outputs
a public broadcast ciphertext c. The broadcast ciphertext can
be publicly sent to members of S so they can derive bk.
4) Decrypt Broadcast Key: Any member of S can discover
bk by performing the decrypt broadcast key operation given
her secret key USK and (S, c).
In contrast to traditional IBBE that requires the use of
a TA to perform the System Setup and Extract User Secret
operations, we rely on SGX enclaves. Therefore, the master
secret key MSK used by the two aforementioned operations
can be made available in plaintext exclusively inside the
enclave, and securely sealed if stored outside of the enclave
for persistence reasons.
Similarly to IBBE, the Encrypt Broadcast Key and Decrypt
Broadcast Key operations rely on the system public key PK,
and are thus usable by any user of the system.
As opposed to the traditional IBBE usage scenario,
our model requires that all group membership changes—
generating the group key and metadata—are performed by
an administrator. Administrators can use the master secret
key MSK to encrypt, set up the system and extract user keys.
The decryption operation, however, remains identical to the
traditional IBBE approach, being executed by any arbitrary
user. In the remainder of this paper, we refer to our new IBBE
scheme as IBBE-SGX.
We now describe the computational simplification oppor-
tunities introduced by IBBE-SGX compared to IBBE [29].
First, by making use of MSK inside the enclave, the complexity
of the encryption operation drops from O(|S|2) for IBBE to
O(|S|) for IBBE-SGX, where |S| is the number of users in the
broadcast group set. The reason behind the complexity drop is
bypassing a polynomial expansion of quadratic cost, necessary
in the traditional IBBE assumptions. The reader is directed to
Section A-C for the concrete mathematical inference process.
We argue that this complexity cut is sufficient to tackle the
impracticality of the IBBE scheme emphasized earlier in
Figure 2. Second, by relying on MSK, one can build efficient
access control specific operations, such as adding or removing
a user from a broadcast group. IBBE-SGX can accommodate
O(1) complexities for both operations, as illustrated in Sec-
tions A-E and A-F.
Unfortunately, IBBE-SGX maintains an O(|S|2) complexity
for the user decrypt operation, during which, similarly to IBBE
encryption, the algorithm performs a polynomial expansion of
quadratic cost. We address this drawback by introducing a
partitioning mechanism as described later in Section IV-C.
Fig. 4. Partitioning mechanism using IBBE-SGX and AES to protect the
Group Key.
Finally, we consider a re-keying operation, for optimally
generating a new broadcast key and metadata when the iden-
tities of users in the group S do not change. The operation can
be performed in O(1) complexity for both IBBE and IBBE-
SGX, as detailed in Section A-G.
C. Partitioning Mechanism for IBBE-SGX
Although IBBE-SGX produces a minimal metadata ex-
pansion and offers an optimal cost for group membership
operations, it suffers from a prohibitive cost when a member
needs to decrypt the broadcast key. To address this issue, we
introduce a partitioning mechanism.
As the decryption time is bound to the number of users
in the receiving set, we split the group into partitions (sub-
groups) and therefore limit the user decryption time to the
number of members in a single partition. Moreover, each
partition broadcast key will wrap the prime group key gk,
so that members of different partitions can communicate by
making use of gk.
The partition mechanism is depicted in Fig 4. The first step
consists in splitting the group of users in fixed-size partitions.
The administrator can then use the encrypt functionality of
IBBE-SGX to generate a sub-group broadcast key bk and
ciphertext ck for each partition k. Next, for each partition, the
group key gk is encrypted using symmetric encryption such as
AES, by using the partition broadcast key bk as the symmetric
encryption key. Note that since the scheme is executing inside
an SGX enclave, a curious administrator cannot observe gk
nor the broadcast keys.
The group metadata of IBBE-SGX is therefore represented
by the set of all pairs composed of the partition ciphertext
and the encrypted group key (i.e. (ci, yi) in Figure 4). The
inquisitive cloud storage can then publicly receive and store
this set of group metadata.
Whenever a membership change happens, the administrator
will update the list of group members and send the affected
partition metadata to the cloud. The clients, in turn, can detect
a change in their group by listening to updates in their partition
metadata.
The partitioning mechanism has an impact on the compu-
tational complexity of the IBBE-SGX scheme on the admin-
istrator side. First, as the public key PK of the IBBE system
is linear in the maximal number of users in a group [29],
results that the public key for the IBBE-SGX scheme is
linear in the maximal number of users in a partition (denoted
5
TABLE I
IBBE-SGX AND IBBE OPERATIONS COMPLEXITIES PER THE NUMBER OF
PARTITIONS OF A GROUP (|P |), THE FIX SIZE OF A PARTITION (|p|) AND
THE CARDINALITY OF THE GROUP MEMBERS SET (|S|).
Operation IBBE-SGX IBBE [29]
System Setup O(|p|) O(|S|)
Extract User Key O(1) O(1)
Create Group Key |P | ×O(|p|) O(|S|2)
Add User to Group O(1)
Remove User from Group |P | ×O(1)
Decrypt Group Key O(|p|2) O(|S|2)
by |p|). Therefore, both the computational complexity and
storage footprint of the system setup phase can be reduced
by a factor representing the maximal number of partitions,
without losing any security guarantee. Second, the complex-
ities of IBBE-SGX operations change to accommodate the
partitioning mechanism, as shown in Table I. Creating a group
becomes the cost of creating as many IBBE-SGX partitions
that the fixed partition size dictates. Adding a user to a group
remains constant, as the new user can be added either to
an existing partition or to a brand new one. Removing a
user implies performing a constant time re-keying for each
partition. Finally, the decryption operation gains by being
quadratic in the number of users of the partition rather than
the whole group.
The partitioning mechanism also has an impact on the
storage footprint for group metadata. Compared to IBBE when
considering a single partition, the footprint is augmented by
the symmetrically encrypted partition broadcast key (i.e. yi)
and the nonce required for this symmetric encryption. When
considering an entire group, the cost of storing the group
metadata is represented by the cost of a single partition
multiplied by the number of partitions in the group, in addition
to a metadata structure that keeps the mapping between users
and partitions.
Although the partition mechanism induces a slight overhead,
the number of partitions in a group is relatively small com-
pared to the group size. Second, partition metadata are only
manipulated by administrators, so they can locally cache it
and thus bypass the cost of accessing the cloud for metadata
structures. Third, as our model accepts that the identities of
group members can be discovered by the curious administrator
or the cloud, there is no cryptographic operation needed to
protect the mappings within the partition metadata structure.
Determining the optimal value for the partition size mainly
depends on the dynamics of the group. Indeed, there is a
trade-off between the number and frequency of operations
performed by the administrator for group membership and
those performed by regular users for decrypting the broadcast
key. A small partition size reduces the decryption time on the
user side while a larger partition size reduces the number of
operations performed by the administrator to run IBBE-SGX
and to maintain the metadata.
Admin API
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IBBE-SGX
 Intel SGX
/g/p1
/g/p2
…
Dropbox
IBBE
Client API
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Admin
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Fig. 5. Big Picture Architecture
V. IBBE-SGX GROUP ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEM
We describe in this section the design and implementation
of an end-to-end group access control system based on IBBE-
SGX. The overall architecture is illustrated in Figure 5 and
consists of a client and an administrator using Dropbox as a
public cloud storage provider.
A. System Design
The administrator’s Application Programming Interface
(API) makes calls to the underlying SGX enclave that hold
the functionalities of IBBE-SGX which is built on top of an
IBBE component. Since SGX is not required on the client side,
the Client API directly calls the functionalities of the IBBE
component. Both administrators and clients make use of local
in-memory caches in order to save round-trips to the cloud for
accessing existing access policies. Administrators make use of
the PUT HTTP verb to send data to the cloud, while clients
are listening by using HTTP long polling. In Dropbox, long
polling works at the directory level, so we index the group
metadata as a bi-level hierarchy. The parent folder represents
the group, and each child stands for a partition.
The operation for creating a group is described in Algo-
rithm 1. Once the fixed-size partitions are determined (line 1),
the execution enters the SGX enclave (lines 2 to 6) during
which the random group key is enveloped by the hash of each
partition broadcast key. The ciphertext values, as well as the
sealed group key, leave the enclave to be later pushed to the
cache and the cloud (line 7).
Algorithm 1 Create Group
Input: Group g, Members S = {u1, ..., un}, Partition size m
1: P ← {{u1, ..., um}, {um+1, ..., u2m}, ...}
Enclaved
2: gk ← RandomKey()
3: for p ∈ P do
4: (bp, cp)← sgx ibbe create partition(MSK, p)
5: yp ← sgx aes(sgx sha(bp), gk)
6: sealed gk ← sgx seal(gk)
7: Store: (1) sealed gk; (2) ∀p ∈ P : 〈∀u ∈ p, yp, cp〉
The operation of adding a user to a group (Algorithm 2)
starts by finding the set of all partitions with remaining
capacity (line 1). If no such a partition is found, a new partition
is created for the user (line 3) and the group key is enveloped
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by the broadcast key of the new partition (lines 4 to 6), before
persisting its ciphertexts (line 7). Otherwise, a partition that is
not empty is randomly picked, and the user is added to it (lines
9, 10). Since the partition broadcast key remains unchanged,
only the ciphertext needs to be adapted to include the new
user (line 10). The partition members and ciphertext are then
updated on the cloud (line 12). Note that there is no need to
push the encrypted group key yadd as it was not changed.
Algorithm 2 Add User to Group
Input: Group: g, Partitions of g: P , User to add: uadd, Sealed
group key: sealed gk.
1: P ′ ← ∀p ∈ P, such that |p| < m.
2: if P ′ = ∅ then
3: padd ← {uadd}
Enclaved
4: (badd, cadd)← sgx ibbe create partition(MSK, padd)
5: gk ← sgx unseal(sealed gk)
6: yadd ← sgx aes(sgx sha(badd), gk)
7: Store: 〈{uadd}, yadd, cadd〉
8: else
9: padd ← RandomItem(P ′)
10: padd ← pu ∪ {uadd}
11: cadd ← sgx add user to partition(MSK, padd, uadd)
12: Update: 〈∀u ∈ padd, ∗, cadd〉
13: P ← padd ∪ P
Removing a user from a group (Algorithm 3) proceeds by
removing the user from her hosting partition (lines 1 and 2).
Next, a new group key is randomly generated (line 3). The
former user hosting partition broadcast key and ciphertext are
changed to reflect the user removal (line 4) and then used for
enveloping the new group key (line 5). For all the remaining
partitions, a constant time re-keying regenerates the partition
broadcast key and ciphertext that envelopes the new group key
(lines 6 to 9). After sealing the new group key (line 10), the
changes of metadata for the group partitions are pushed to the
cloud (line 11). Note that the partition members only need to
be updated for the removed user hosting partition.
Algorithm 3 Remove User urem from Group g
Input: Group: g, Partitions of g: P , User to remove: urem.
1: prem ← p ∈ P, such that urem ∈ p.
2: prem ← prem \ {urem}
Enclaved
3: gk ← RandomKey()
4: (brem, crem)← sgx remove user(MSK, prem, urem)
5: yrem ← sgx aes(sgx sha(brem), gk)
6: for p ∈ P \ prem do
7: (bp, cp)← sgx rekey partition(p)
8: yp ← sgx aes(sgx sha(bp), gk)
9: sealed gk ← sgx seal(gk)
10: Update: (1) 〈∀ui ∈ prem, yrem, crem〉
11: (2) ∀p ∈ P \ prem : 〈∗, yp, cp〉
As many removal operations can result in partially unoccu-
pied partitions, we propose the use of a re-partitioning scheme
whenever the partition occupancies are too low. We implement
a heuristic to detect a low occupancy factor such that if less
than half of the partitions are only two thirds full, then re-
partitioning is triggered. Re-partitioning consists in simply re-
creating the group following Algorithm 1.
Finally, the client decrypt operation works by first using
IBBE to decrypt the broadcast key and then use the hash of
this key for an AES decryption to obtain the group key. Due to
space constraints, we omit the formal algorithm specification.
B. Implementation
In order to implement the system, we used the PBC [10]
pairing-based cryptography library which, in turn, depends
on GMP [11] to perform arbitrary precision arithmetics. They
both have to be used inside SGX enclaves (Section IV).
There are several challenges when porting legacy code to run
inside enclaves. Besides having severe memory limitations
(Section III-A), it also considers privileged code running in
any protection ring but user-mode (ring 3) as not trusted.
Therefore, enclaves cannot call operating system routines.
Although memory limitations can have performance impli-
cations at runtime, they have little influence on enclave code
porting. Calls to the operating system, on the other hand, can
render this task very complex or even unfeasible. Luckily,
since both PBC and GMP mostly perform computations rather
than input and output operations, the challenges on adapting
them were chiefly restrained to tracking and adapting calls to
glibc. The adaptations needed were done either by relaying op-
erations to the operating system through outside calls (ocalls),
or performing them with enclaved equivalents. The outside
calls, however, do not perform any sensitive action that could
compromise security. Aside from source code modifications,
we dedicated efforts to adapt the compilation toolchain. This
happens because one has to use curated versions of standard
libraries (like the ones provided by Intel SGX SDK), besides
having to prevent the use of compiler’s built-in functions and
setting some other code generation flags. The total number of
Lines of Code (LoCs) or compilation toolchain files that were
modified were 32 lines for PBC and 299 for GMP.
Apart from changes imposed by SGX, we also needed to
use common cryptographic libraries. Although some functions
are provided in v.1.9 of the Intel SGX SDK [19], its AES
implementation is limited to 128 bits. Since we aim at the
maximal security level, we used the AES 256 bits implemen-
tation provided in Intel’s port of OpenSSL [30]. The end-to-
end system encapsulating both IBBE-SGX and HE schemes
consists in 3,152 lines of C/C++ code and 170 lines of Python.
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we benchmark the performance of the IBBE-
SGX scheme from three different perspectives: by measuring
the operations performance in isolation, then by comparing
them to Hybrid Encryption (HE), and finally by capturing
the performance when replaying realistic and generated access
control traces. We chose to compare IBBE-SGX to HE only
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Fig. 6. Performance of the system bootstrap phase.
as the latter already shows better computational complexity
than IBBE (see Figure 2a).
The experiments were performed on a quad-core Intel i7-
6600U machine, having a processor at 3.4 GHz with 16 GB
of RAM, using Ubuntu 16.04 LTS.
A. Microbenchmarks
Within the microbenchmarks we isolate the performance of
each IBBE-SGX operation, and perform a comparison with
the HE scheme.
First, we evaluate the performance of the bootstrap phase.
It consists on setting up the system and generating secret
user keys, referenced in Figure 6. One can notice that the
setup phase latency increases linearly per partition size, with
a growth of 1.2s per 1,000 users. In contrast, extracting secret
user keys gives an average throughput of 764 operations per
second, independent of the partition size.
Next, we evaluate the behavior of IBBE-SGX operations
compared to HE. Figure 7a displays the computational cost for
operations of creating a group, removing a user from a group,
and the storage footprint of the group metadata. One can notice
that all three operations are better than their HE counterparts
by approximately a constant factor. The computational cost of
create and remove operations of IBBE-SGX is on average 1.2
orders of magnitude faster than HE. Compared to the original
IBBE scheme, IBBE-SGX is better by 2.4 orders of magnitude
for groups of 1,000 users and 3.9 orders of magnitude for one
million users (see Figures 2a and 7a). Storage-wise, IBBE-
SGX is up to 6 orders of magnitude better than HE. Moreover,
Figure 7b zooms into the performances of IBBE-SGX create
and remove operations, and the storage footprint respectively,
when considering different sizes of partitions. One can notice
that the remove operation takes half the time than the create
operation. Considering the storage footprint, the degradation
brought by using smaller partition sizes is fairly small (e.g.,
432 vs. 128 bytes for groups of 1 million members).
The Cumulative Density Function (CDF) of latencies for
adding a user to a group is shown in Figure 8a. The operation
has a constant time complexity for both IBBE-SGX and HE.
As the add operation of IBBE-SGX can take two paths, either
adding a user to an existing partition or creating a new one if
all the others are full, the plot points the difference between the
two at the CDF value of 0.8. Moreover, the HE add operation
is generally twice as fast as IBBE-SGX.
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Fig. 8. Performance of the adding a user to a group and decrypt operations.
The client decryption performance is shown in Figure 8b.
The decryption operation, like the add operation, is faster
within the HE approach than IBBE-SGX. The difference of
2 orders of magnitude is caused by the quadratic cost of
the IBBE-SGX decryption operation. We argue that a slower
decryption time for IBBE-SGX can be acceptable in practice.
First, the decrypt performance is overshadowed by the slow
cloud response time necessary for clients to update the group
metadata that always precedes a decryption operation. Second,
the cost of decryption remains bounded to a partition size,
independent on the number of users in the group.
B. Macrobenchmarks
1) Real Data Set: To capture the performance of the IBBE-
SGX scheme within a realistic scenario, we decide to replay
an access control trace based on the membership changes in
the version control repository of the Linux Kernel [31].
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Fig. 9. Measuring total administrator replay time and average user decryption
time per different partition sizes using the Linux Kernel ACL data set.
We derive the membership trace by considering the first
commit of a user as the add to group operation. The remove
from group operation is represented by the user’s last commit.
The generated trace contains 43,468 membership operations
that spawn across a period of 10 years, during which the
group size never exceeds 2803 users. We replay the generated
trace sequentially for both HE and IBBE-SGX by varying
the partition size. We also capture the total time spent by
the administrator to replay the trace and the average user
decryption time.
Figure 9 displays the results. Considering the administrator
replay time, IBBE-SGX performs better when the partition
size converges to the number of users in the group. Using
a small partition size, e.g. 250, is almost twice as inefficient
when compared to a partition of 1000 users. Compared to
HE replay time, IBBE-SGX is generally 1 order of magnitude
faster. On the other hand, decryption time for IBBE-SGX
grows quadratically per partition size while in HE it remains
constant. This evidentiates IBBE-SGX’s trade-off caused by
different partition sizes on the performances of membership
changes and user decryption time. A prior estimation of the
maximal group size (2803 in our case) suggests the choice of
a small partition for practical use (such as 750), so that it can
manifest satisfactory outcomes both in terms of admininistra-
tor performance and user decryption time.
2) Synthetic Data Set: In order to observe the impact of
different workloads of group membership access control, we
generate a set of synthetic traces that capture incremental
percentages of revocation rates. Concretely, we generate 11
different traces consisting of 10,000 membership operations.
The composition of the traces is randomly generated by
considering different revocation rates. We replay the 11 traces
through our system and measure the end-to-end time required
by the administrator to perform all membership changes. We
then repeat the process by considering different partition sizes.
The results are shown in Figure 10. We observe a linear
increase in the total time when incrementally increasing the
revocation ratio up to 50% in workloads dominated by add
operations. After this point, the total time stabilizes and
finally decreases when the revocation ratio is more than 90%.
This behavior is caused by the merging of sparse partitions,
which happens more frequently with the increasing rate of
revocations. Having fewer partitions, IBBE-SGX’s operations
become faster, therefore decreasing the total time.
Fig. 10. Measuring total replay time of IBBE-SGX scheme per different par-
tition sizes (1000, 1500, 2000) for synthetically generated datasets considering
increasing revocation rates.
VII. RELATED WORK
We structure the presentation of the related work on three
axes detailing first research work on cryptographic schemes
used for access control. Then we go into research work of
systems that cryptographically protect from untrusted storages.
Last, we detail related work regarding Intel SGX.
A. Cryptographic Schemes for Access Control
HE making use of a PKI and IBE has been utilized within
a role based access control and proved unsuitable in the cloud
storage context [3].
ABE [32] is a cryptographic construction that allows a fine-
grained access control by matching attributes labeled to both
users and content. Depending on the labeled location, one
can distinguish between key-policy ABE [6] and ciphertext-
policy ABE [33]. However, when employed for simple access
control policies, such as our group sharing context, ABE has
substantially greater costs than identity-based encryption [3].
Hierarchical Identity Based Encryption (HIBE) [34] and
Functional Encryption (FE) [35] are two cryptographic
schemes offering functionalities for access control that, sim-
ilarly to IBE and ABE, rely on pairing-based cryptography.
HIBE is specifically designed to target hierarchical organiza-
tions where a notion of descendants exists. FE is a powerful
construction that can arbitrarily encapsulate programs as ac-
cess control, but is unsuitable for practical use [36].
Proxy re-encryption [37] is a cryptographic system in
which the owner of some encrypted data can delegate the
re-encryption of her data to a proxy, with the intent of
sharing it with another user. For the re-encryption to take
place, the data owner needs to generate and transmit to
the proxy a re-encryption key. The scheme proves to be
beneficial for the cloud environment, as the re-encryption and
the storage of the data can happen on the same premises. A
number of approaches have shown how proxy re-encryption
can be combined with identity-based encryption [8], or with
attribute-based encryption [38], [39]. Differently than proxy
re-encryption, our construction does not require users to send
transformational keys to the administrators. Therefore, even
if the administrators would be hosted on the cloud storage
premises, they do not act as proxies.
The related research area of multicast communication secu-
rity [22], [40] defines efficient schemes focusing exclusively
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on revocation aspects. Logical Key Hierarchy [41] is a re-
keying scheme in which communications for revocation oper-
ations are minimized to logarithmic sizes. Other schemes [26],
[42] exploit a secret sharing mechanism, considering that no
coalition of revoked users larger than a threshold number is
trying to decrypt the transmission.
B. Cryptographically Protected Untrusted Storages
The shared cloud-backed file system (SCFS) designed by
Bessani et al. [2] offers confidentiality guarantees to users by
encrypting data stored by the clouds on the client-side. Even
though the encryption keys are distributed among multiple
cloud storages through secret sharing schemes, the access
control is not cryptographically protected, but stored and en-
forced from a trusted coordination service. We argue that this
approach is not secure enough because it does not protect from
curious administrators. The global access control structure can
be compromised if an attacker gain access to this service.
CloudProof [43] is a secure cloud storage system offering
guarantees such as confidentiality, integrity, freshness and
write-serializability. To enforce access control, CloudProof
makes use of broadcast encryption to protect the keys that are
used for encrypting and signing the actual data. Unlike our
construction, CloudProof does not offer the zero knowledge
guarantee for membership operations. Moreover, CloudProof
does not discuss how the authentic identity of the users in
the broadcast set is established (e.g. during a group creation
operation). Hypothetically, a PKI could be employed for this
task, thus requiring a trusted entity in the system. However
accessing regularly the PKI would add a significant overhead.
In order to mitigate these issues, our solution relies on the
identity-based version of broadcast encryption.
REED [44] considers the problem of rekeying in the context
of honest-but-curious deduplicated storages. To provide access
control, REED relies on ABE. However, as noted by the
authors in their evaluation, the performance overhead of the
rekeying operation drastically increase to several seconds
when varying the total number of users up to 500. Considering
group sizes of thousands of users (as we do for groups up to
one million), ABE becomes impracticable for access control
at large scale.
Sieve [45] platform allows users to store their data encrypted
in the cloud and then discretionary delegate access to the
data to consuming web services. Sieve makes use of attribute
based encryption for access control policies and key homomor-
phism for providing a zero knowledge guarantee against the
storage provider. This access control construction has many
similarities with ours, however we differentiate exploiting
the zero knowledge guarantee for lowering the computational
complexity of the access control scheme, IBBE in our case.
C. SGX
SGX has been extensively used in shielding applications and
infrastructure platform services like ours that handle sensitive
data. Iron [36] is the closest to our proposal in the sense
that it takes advantage of SGX to build a practical encryption
scheme for an unpractical strategy thus far. Like us, they use
an enclave that holds a master secret as root for later key
derivations. They target, however, functional encryption. The
enclave generates a key that is associated to a function, so
that the computation can be performed without revealing the
data on top of which it is applied. The results of applying
such function, though, are presented in clear. The authors show
that this approach outperforms by orders of magnitude other
cryptographic schemes that also offer functional encryption.
Other systems relate to ours with regards to the reduction
of overhead for an otherwise costlier design. Hybster [46], for
instance, proposes a hybrid state-machine replication protocol.
Hybrid because it does tolerate arbitrary faults but yet it
assumes that some nodes may crash. It relies on SGX features
such as isolation, replay protection and trusted counters to
achieve a parallelization scheme that makes it a viable solu-
tion for demanding applications, reaching higher numbers of
operations per second in comparison to traditional approaches.
At the level of infrastructure services, SCBR [47] proposes
a content-based routing solution where the filtering step is put
inside enclaves, thus allowing the matching of publications
against stored subscriptions in a safe manner. It is shown to
be one order of magnitude faster than an approach with com-
parable security guarantees. The gain comes from the plaintext
operations done inside the enclave against the counterpart that
needs to perform computations over encrypted data.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have introduced IBBE-SGX, a new cryptographic access
control extension that is built upon Identity-Based Broadcast-
ing Encryption (IBBE) and exploits Intel Software Guard Ex-
tensions (SGX) to derive cuts in the computational complexity
of IBBE. We propose a group partitioning mechanism such
that the computational cost of membership update is bound
to a fixed constant partition size rather than the size of the
whole group. We have implemented and evaluated our new
access control extension in a single administrator with multiple
users set-up. We have conducted both real and synthetic
benchmarks, demonstrating that IBBE-SGX is efficient both
in terms of computation and storage even when processing
large and dynamic workloads of membership operations. Our
innovative construction performs membership changes 1.2
orders of magnitude faster than the traditional approach of
Hybrid Encryption (HE), producing group metadata that are 6
orders of magnitude smaller than HE, while at the same time
offering zero knowledge guarantees.
There are a number of interesting avenues of future work.
The first is to dynamically adapt the partition sizes based
on the undergoing workload. This would optimize the speed
of administrator- and user-performed operations. A second
challenge would be to adapt our construction to a distributed
set of administrators that would perform membership changes
concurrently on the same group or partition, by using lock-free
techniques. Third, in a setup with multiple administrators, one
can envision certifying blocks of membership operations logs
through blockchain-like technologies.
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APPENDIX A
This appendix details the mathematical implications of
adapting IBBE to IBBE-SGX. In typical IBBE schemes,
Trusted Authorities (TAs) only execute the operations of
system setup and extracting user secret keys. In IBBE-SGX,
however, the administrator agent executes all membership
operations by executing them inside an SGX enclave.
The IBBE scheme [29] conceptually relies on the idea of
bilinear maps. Notated as: e (·, ·) : G1×G2 → GT , a bilinear
map is defined by using three cyclic groups of prime order p,
imposing bilinearity and non-degeneracy. El Mrabet et al. [48]
provide a thorough overview of bilinear maps usage within the
cryptographic setting. Moreover, the IBBE scheme implies the
public knowledge of a cryptographic hash function H, that
maps user identity strings to values in Z∗p.
A. System Setup
The initial operation is identical for IBBE and IBBE-SGX.
The algorithm receives (λ,m) as input, where λ represents the
security strength level of the cryptosystem, and m encapsulates
the largest envisioned group size. The output consists of the
Master Secret Key MSK and the system Public Key PK. To
build MSK , the algorithm randomly picks g ∈ G1andγ ∈ Z∗p :
MSK = (g, γ). To construct the PK, the algorithm computes
w = gγ and v = e (g, h), where h ∈ G2 was randomly
picked: PK =
(
w, v, h, hγ , hγ
2
, ..., hγ
m
)
. The computational
complexity of the system setup algorithm is linear to m.
B. User Key Extraction
The key extraction operation is identical for IBBE and
IBBE-SGX. For a given user identity u, the operation makes
use of MSK and computes : USK = g(γ+H(u))
−1
.
C. Encrypt Broadcast Key
The algorithm for constructing a broadcast key differs by
considering the specific usage assumption. If for IBBE the
algorithm has to rely on PK, for IBBE-SGX one can make use
of MSK . In both cases, the group broadcast key is randomly
generated by choosing a random value k ∈ Z∗p and computing:
bk = v
k (1)
A group broadcast ciphertext (C1, C2) is then constructed
by:
C1 = w
−k (2)
C2 = h
k· ∏
u∈S
(γ+H(u))
(3)
For IBBE, γ cannot be used directly for computing C2.
Instead, the computation is carried out with a polynomial
expansion of the exponent that uses the public key elements:
C2 =
((
hγ
n
)
·
(
hγ
n−1)E1 · (hγn−2)E2 · ... · (hγ)En−1)k
(4)
E1 =
∑
u∈S H (u)
E2 =
∑
u1,u2∈S,u16=u2H (u1) · H (u2)
...
En−1 =
∏
u∈S H(u)
For IBBE, computing C2 is bound by the computations of
all E , thus requires a quadratic number of operations O (|S|2).
In the case of IBBE-SGX, having access to MSK allows
computing C2 directly using Formula 3. It thus requires a
linear number of operations.
Moreover, we augment the ciphertext values with C3, which
will prove useful for the subsequent operations:
C3 = h
∏
u∈S
(γ+H(u))
(5)
Note that C3 can be stored publicly as it can be computed
entirely from PK.
D. Decrypt Broadcast Key
The decrypt operation is executed identically for IBBE and
IBBE-SGX, and relies on PK. A user can make use of her
secret key uSK to compute bk, given (S, C) We chose to
omit presenting the intricate formula as we maintain it in the
original form, as shown in [29].
E. Add User to Broadcast Key
As the joining user uadd is allowed to decrypt group secrets
prior to joining, there is no need of a re-key operation by
changing the value of bk. The only required change is therefore
to incorporate uadd into S, and H (uadd) into C2.
For IBBE, including H(uadd) into all E values requires a
quadratic number of operations. For IBBE-SGX, by making
use of MSK , one has access to γ, thus the new user is included
in constant time: C2 ← (C2)γ+H(uadd).
F. Remove User form Broadcast Key
Whenever removing a user urem, all group elements bk,S
and C need to change. bk and C1 can be computed by Formulas
1 and 2, once a new random value for k ∈ Z∗p is picked.
Within the traditional assumption, C2 is computed similarly
to encrypting group key operation, consuming a quadratic
number of operations. Within IBBE-SGX, having access to
γ through the MSK allows first changing C3 and then C2 in
constant time:
C3 ← (C3)(γ+H(urem))
−1
(6)
C2 ← (C3)k (7)
G. Re-key Broadcast Key
Sometimes, it is necessary to change the value of bk without
performing any group membership changes. This re-keying
operation can be performed optimally in constant time under
both usage model assumptions, by making use of C3.
First, a new random k ∈ Z∗p is generated and the new key
computed by Formula 1. C1 can be computed by Formula 2,
while C2 is computed from C3 by Formula 7.
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